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PREVIEW—County of Maui, Hawaii v. Hawaii Wildlife Fund: 
Clean Water Act Regulation of Point Source Pollution Conveyed 
through Groundwater 
  
Connlan William Whyte* 
 
The Supreme Court of the United States will hear oral arguments 
in this matter on Wednesday, November 6, 2019, at 10:00 a.m. at the 
Supreme Court Building in Washington, D.C. Elbert Lin will likely appear 
for the Petitioner. David Lane Henkin will likely appear for the 
Respondents. Solicitor General, Noel J. Francisco, will argue on behalf of 




County of Maui, Hawaii v. Hawaii Wildlife Fund asks whether the 
Clean Water Act (“CWA”) requires a polluter to acquire a permit when 
pollutants originate from within a point source but are conveyed to 
navigable waters through a nonpoint source, such as sediment erosion or 
groundwater.1 The petitioner, the County of Maui (“County”), owns and 
operates four wells with the Lahaina Wastewater Reclamation Facility 
(“LWRF”) that discharge wastewater into the groundwater and, 
eventually, into the Pacific Ocean.2 Wastewater marked with dye was 
deposited in three of the four wells and later found in the Pacific Ocean 
after seeping through groundwater.3 The Hawai’i Wildlife Fund, Sierra 
Club, Surfrider Foundation, and West Maui Preservation Association 
(collectively here “Respondents”) sued, alleging that the County’s four 
sewage injection wells require permits under the National Pollutant 
Discharge Elimination System (“NPDES”) for the transfer of wastewater 
through groundwater to navigable waters.4  
 
II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
 
Since 1985, the County has operated four injection wells at the 
LWRF and injects three to five million gallons of treated sewage into the 
 
* Connlan Whyte, J.D. & M.P.A Candidate 2021, Alexander Blewett 
III School of Law at the University of Montana. 
1. Hawai’i Wildlife Fund v. County of Maui, 886 F.3d 737, 742 (9th 
Cir. 2018) [hereinafter Maui II].  
2. Id. 
3. Id. at 743. 
4. Id.; A party “violates the CWA when it does not obtain [a NPDES] 
permit and (1) discharges (2) a pollutant (3) to navigable waters (4) from a point 
source; however, under 33 U.S.C.§§ 1311(a) and 1342(a)(1), a party “who obtains a 
NPDES permit is exempt from the general prohibition on point source pollution. Id. 
at 744 (internal quotations omitted) (citing Headwaters, Inc. v. Talent Irrigation Dist., 
243 F.3d 526, 532 (9th Cir. 2001); see infra Section III, Subsection A. 
2 PUBLIC LAND & RESOURCES LAW REVIEW Vol. 0 
groundwater per day.5 Seeking to better understand the hydrological 
connections between the injected wastewater and the coastal waters, the 
Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”), the Hawaii Department of 
Health (“HDOH”), and others commissioned a tracer dye study (“Study”) 
to track the treated effluent travels.6 
In June 2013, those groups, with assistance from the University of 
Hawaii, dyed the effluent being injected into three of the four County 
wells, and eighty-four days later, researchers documented the presence of 
dyed wastewater in the nearby Pacific Ocean.7 Approximately sixty-four 
percent of the sewage effluent was found to have made its way to the 
Pacific Ocean. The Study also suggested, and the County conceded, that 
all four wells transferred sewage to the ocean in the same manner.8 
Accordingly, the Study showed that the County’s wells were connected to 
navigable waters via groundwater.9  
In 2014, the Respondents sued the County in the United States 
District Court for the District of Hawaii, alleging that the CWA required 
the County to have NPDES permits for its wells because they transferred 
effluent from four point sources—through the groundwater—to navigable 
waters.10 The County moved to dismiss, claiming that the pollutants were 
not covered by the CWA because they passed through a nonpoint source  
before entering navigable waters. The district court granted summary 
judgment in favor of the Respondents.11 
The County appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Ninth Circuit, claiming that the LWRF’s wells do not fall under NPDES 
jurisdiction and that the County was not given fair notice of any CWA 
violations.12 On appeal, the Ninth Circuit affirmed, holding that: (1) the 
County was liable under the CWA for the unpermitted discharge of 
effluent, which was fairly traceable, into navigable waters in more than a 
de minimis amount; and (2) the County had fair notice, consistent with due 
process requirements, that the CWA prohibited these discharges without a 
permit.13 The Court based its opinion on the traceable nature of the 
pollutants and the isolation and identification of the wells as sources.14 
Suggesting that any other ruling would be a mockery of the intent of the 
CWA, the Court stated the case was “about preventing the County from 
 
5. Id. at 742. 
6. Id.  
7. Id. at 742–43. 
8. Id. at 743. 
9. Id. 
10. Hawai’i Wildlife Fund v. County of Maui, 24 F. Supp. 3d 980, 983 
(D. Haw. 2014) [hereinafter Maui I]. 
11. Id. at 1005. 
12. Maui II, 886 F.3d at 742.  
13. Id. at 752.  
14. Id. at 749, 752; cf. Ecological Rights Found. v. Pacific Gas & Elec. 
Co., 713 F.3d 502, 508 (9th Cir. 2013) (deeming the pollution in question not easily 
trackable to one source, where the sources in question were not easily regulated by 
nature). 
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doing indirectly that which it cannot do directly.”15 The County petitioned 
for certiorari with the Supreme Court of the United States, which agreed 
on February 19, 2019, to hear the case.16 
 
III. SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS 
 
A.      Background 
 
In 1972, Congress passed the CWA “to restore and maintain the 
chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the Nation’s waters”17 and 
to encourage that “waste treatment management planning processes be 
developed and implemented to assure adequate control of sources of 
pollutants in each State.”18 The  CWA stipulates that pollution from a point 
source into navigable waters must have an NPDES permit to monitor its 
levels of pollution.19 A point source is “any discernible, confined and 
discrete conveyance, including but not limited to any pipe, ditch, channel, 
tunnel, conduit, [or] well . . . .”20 Navigable waters are defined as “the 
waters of the United States, including the territorial seas.”21  Most wells 
that discharge sewage directly into groundwater do not require NPDES 
permits because the effluent is not going into navigable water but instead 
into the groundwater.22 For example, in League of Wilderness Defenders 
v. Forsgren, the Ninth Circuit held that a nonpoint source of pollution is 
“the type of pollution that arises from many dispersed activities over large 
areas, and is not traceable to any single discrete source.”23 Further, the 
Sixth Circuit in Kentucky Waterways Alliance v. Kentucky Utilities 
Company, held that groundwater is not a point source because it is “neither 
confined nor discrete” and one cannot “discern its precise contours as can 
be done with traditional point sources like pipes, ditches, or tunnels.”24  
In 2001, the Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) released 
a report on proposed rule changes for concentrated animal feeding 
operations (“CAFO”).25 Within the report, the EPA stated that the 
pollution caused by CAFOs was to be regulated as point source pollution 
under the CWA even though the pollution was transferred through 
 
15. Maui II, 886 F.3d at 752. 
16. County of Maui, Hawaii v. Hawaii Wildlife Fund, 139 S. Ct. 1164 
(2019). 
17. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(5) (2012). 
18. Id.  
19. Id. §§ 407, 1342.  
20. Id. § 1362(14).  
21. Id. § 1362(7).  
22. Id. § 407.  
23. 309 F.3d 1181, 1184 (9th Cir. 2002). 
24. 905 F.3d 925, 933 (6th Cir. 2018).  
25. National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System Permit Regulation 
and Effluent Limitations Guidelines and Standards for Concentrated Animal Feeding 
Operations, 66 Fed. Reg. 2,960 (Jan. 12, 2001). 
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groundwater before it entered navigable waters.26 The EPA’s NPDES 
report stated that “about 40 percent of the average annual stream flow is 
from groundwater”; therefore groundwater that has a direct hydrological 
connection to navigable waters can be regulated under the CWA.27  
Further, the Fourth Circuit in Upstate Forever v. Kinder Morgan Energy 
Partners, L.P. held that the CWA’s “from a point source”28 language refers 
to a starting point of pollution, and thus point source pollution that passes 
through groundwater and into navigable waters should be regulated.29 
Lastly, the Ninth Circuit held that an “indirect” transfer of pollutants from 
a point source to navigable waters would require an NPDES permit.30 
 
B.     Petitioner’s Arguments 
 
 The County argues that the Respondents have misinterpreted the 
CWA’s longstanding treatment of point source pollution.31 The County 
asserts that the CWA does not have a regulatory scheme that requires 
coverage of nonpoint source pollution, which would be an “enormous and 
transformative expansion” of the CWA.32  Moreover, the County argues 
that the CWA clearly sets up a “means-of-delivery test” and the phrase 
“from . . . any point source” refers to a direct connection between the point 
source and navigable waters, not a starting point of pollution.33 The 
County claims: (1) CWA’s statutory language unequivocally sets out a 
“means-of-delivery”34 test through the statute’s definition of “discharge of 
pollutants”;35 (2) the “means-of-delivery” test conforms with the structure 
of the CWA; and (3) the test requires point sources to be the “means-of-
delivery” of the pollution into navigable waters, not the “proximate 
cause.”36  
Additionally, the County argues that “[t]he CWA’s ‘substantial’ 
penalties also call for the predictability provided by the means-of-delivery 
test.”37 Accordingly, a pollutant transferred through groundwater lacks the 
 
26. Id. at 2,964. 
27. Id. at 3,016. 
28. 33 U.S.C. § 1362(12)(A). 
29. 887 F.3d 637, 650 (4th Cir. 2018).  
30. Maui II, 886 F.3d at 768. 
31. Pet’r’s Reply Br. at 1, Aug. 19, 2019, No. 18-260. 
32. Id. (quoting Utility Air Regulatory Grp. v. EPA, 573 U.S. 302, 324 
(2014)). 
33. Id. at 3; 33 U.S.C. § 1362(12); see also Sierra Club v. Virginia 
Electric & Power Co., 903 F.3d 403, 409 (4th Cir. 2018) (holding that if a plaintiff 
shows a direct hydrological connection between a point source and groundwater, the 
transfer of the pollution through the groundwater must be regulated by NPDES 
permits). 
34. Pet’r’s Reply Br. at 3. 
35. 33 U.S.C. § 1362(12).  
36. Pet’r’s Reply Br. at 11–12. 
37. Id. at 12 (quoting United States Army Corps of Eng’rs v. Hawkes 
Co., Inc., 136 S. Ct. 1807, 1812 (2016)).  
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predictability of point source pollution found within the CWA’s definition 
of “point source.”38 Further, the County contends that the legislative 
history of the CWA supports the means-of-delivery test through Congress’ 
refusal to recognize groundwater specific proposals39and that Congress 
specifically “entrusted nonpoint source pollution, like releases from the 
County’s wells, to the States.”40 
The County argues that the Court has confirmed its interpretation 
of the means-of-delivery test through both Utility Air Regulatory Group v. 
EPA and  Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County v. U.S Army Corps 
of Engineers.41 The UARG Court held that the EPA’s interpretation of the 
Clean Air Act (“CAA”) placed “plainly excessive demands on limited 
governmental resources[,]” which “alone was a good reason for rejecting 
it.”42 The County asserts that the Court’s holding of an “excessive” 
interpretation of a statute applies to the  Respondents’ “excessive” 
interpretation of the CWA.43 Secondly, the SWANCC Court held that 
“Congress does not casually authorize administrative agencies to interpret 
a statute to push the limit of congressional authority.”44 Therefore, the 
Court should not look at the EPA’s interpretation of the CWA but instead 
look for Congress’ clear intent.45  
The County further contends that nonpoint source pollution is left 
for state regulation because additional federal oversite would upset the 
“balance between federally mandated permits and state-led nonpoint 
source management programs.”46 Finally, the County argues that its wells 
are not polluting into navigable waters, under the CWA, because the “path 
between the point source and jurisdictional surface waters is too attenuated 
. . . .”47 The County maintains that ground water cannot be considered a 
point source because it is neither “confined [n]or discrete.”48 
 
C.      Respondents’ Arguments 
 
Initially, the Respondents argue that a black-letter interpretation 
of the “CWA’s core prohibition . . . bars the County’s unpermitted 
‘addition of [a] pollutant’—the Facility’s effluent—'to navigable 
waters’—the Pacific Ocean—'from [a] point source’—the wells.”49 The 
 
38. Id. at 13–14; 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14).  
39. Pet’r’s Reply Br. at 16. 
40. Id. at 17. 
41. Id. at 18; 573 U.S. at 324; 531 U.S. 159, 171 (2001). 
42. 573 U.S. at 324.  
43. Pet’r’s Reply Br. at 20 (quoting Utility Air Regulatory Grp., 573 U.S. 
at 324). 
44. 531 U.S. at 172–73.  
45. Pet’r’s Reply Br. at 21. 
46. Id.  
47. Id. at 23 (internal quotations omitted).  
48. Id. at 22 (quoting 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14)).  
49. Br. for Resp’ts at 1, July 12, 2019, No. 18-260 (quoting 33 U.S.C. § 
1362).  
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Respondents contend that the CWA’s provisions not only apply to point 
source pollutants “directly” transferred into navigable waters but also to 
any pollutants transferred into closely associated navigable waters from 
point sources.50 Moreover, they maintain that indirect transfers of 
pollutants are covered by the CWA under Justice Scalia’s opinion in 
Rapanos v. United States, where he stated “the [CWA] does not forbid the 
addition of any pollutant directly to navigable waters from any point 
source, but rather the addition of any pollutant to navigable waters.”51  
The Respondents assert that Justice Scalia’s phrasing avoided 
writing “directly” into the CWA and instead clarified that the CWA 
covered more pollutants than just those transferred “directly” into 
navigable waters.52 This argument does not distinguish Scalia’s definition 
of “waters of the United States” but instead allows for point source 
pollution into those “waters” not directly from point sources but rather 
generally “from” point sources.53 The Respondents further assert that the 
CWA’s “inclusion of ‘well[s]’” in its definition of “point source”54 directly 
alludes to groundwater conveyance as a form of pollutant transfer subject 
to NPDES permits.55 The Respondents contend that wells almost 
exclusively operate within groundwater rather than in direct contact with 
navigable waters.56 Similarly, they state that “[t]he County seeks to rewrite 
the [CWA] to apply only when a point source or series of point sources 
conveys pollutants directly to navigable waters[,]” which is in direct 
conflict with both the Court's ruling in Rapanos and the CWA’s plain 
language.57  
Further, the Respondents argue that any “addition of pollutants to 
a waterbody has taken place whenever the waterbody contains more 
pollutants than it did before”58; therefore the County is responsible for the 
addition of pollutants to the Pacific Ocean off the west coast of Maui.59 
The Respondents also maintain that the LWRF wells are subject to NPDES 
regulation because the sewage effluent could “traceably and foreseeably 
reach navigable waters.”60 Furthermore, they contend that the County’s 
 
50. Id. at 12. 
51. Id. at 2–3 (quoting 547 U.S. 715, 743 (2006) (plurality) (internal 
quotations omitted) (emphasis in original)).  
52. Id. 
53. Id. at 739, 743. 
54. Br. for Resp’ts at 13 (quoting 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14)).  
55. Id. 
56. Id. 
57. Id. at 13–14.  
58. Id. at 17 (citing South Florida Water Mgmt. Dist. v. Miccosukee 
Tribe, 541 U.S. 95, 109–112 (2004) (holding that the transfer of polluted water 
through a point source was subject to NPDES regulation even if the point source did 
not pollute the water being transferred into navigable waters)).  
59. Id. 
60. Id. at 19 (citing Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 743 (holding that pollutants 
discharged into intermittent channels that naturally wash downstream into navigable 
waters could be regulated by NPDES permits)).  
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interpretation of indirect discharges conflicts with Congress’ intended use 
of NPDES permits.61 NPDES regulation replaced the prior Refuse Act,62 
and federal circuit courts had interpreted the Refuse Act broadly to include 
indirect deposits of refuse.63 Lastly, the Respondents argue that 
groundwater protection under the CWA would complement other water 
protection statutes such as the Safe Drinking Water Act (“SDWA”),64 thus 
supporting the Court’s consideration in uniting statutes within the same 




A. The Clean Water Act’s Plain Language 
 
The Court must address the directness required for point source 
transfer of pollution to navigable waters. In deciding this case, the Court 
will have to grapple with some of the questions left unanswered in 
Rapanos.66 Interpretation of the CWA’s plain language will be central to 
this analysis. The County contends that the CWA regulates point source 
pollution when it directly enters navigable waters.67 The Respondents 
disagree and state that a point source must be the origin of the pollution, 
and the conveyance of the pollution must directly connect to the point 
source.68 As in Rapanos, the question here concerns whether the plain 
language of the CWA applies to pollution conveyance through 
groundwater, a nonpoint source. There, the Court held, in a plurality 
opinion authored by Justice Scalia, that the filling of ditches next to 
wetlands did not violate the CWA because the Plaintiffs could not prove a 
“significant nexus” between the ditches and wetlands.69  
The Court currently consists of five justices from the Rapanos 
opinion, three of whom were in the majority and two in the dissent. Those 
members of the Court will likely approach the issue of interpretation of 
the CWA as they did in Rapanos.70 In Rapanos, Chief Justice Roberts 
wrote a separate concurrence expressing frustration that none of the 
 
61. Id. at 25. 
62. 33 U.S.C. § 407 (1899). 
63. Br. for Resp’ts at 25 (citing United States v. Esso Standard Oil Co. 
of P.R., 375 F.2d 621, 623 (3rd Cir. 1967) (holding that an oil discharge with close 
proximity to the sea was not a direct deposit of refuse into the sea but was covered by 
the Refuse Act because the refuse was deposited in close proximity to the sea and its 
indirect transfer to the sea was easily foreseeable)).  
64. 42 U.S.C. § 300f. 
65. Br. for Resp’ts at 49 (citing POM Wonderful LLC v. Coca-Cola Co., 
573 U.S. 102, 115 (2014) (holding that statutes with complimentary purpose are read 
as to give effect to each other rather than to displace each other)). 
66. Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 743. 
67. Pet’r’s Reply Br. at 12. 
68. Br. for Resp’ts at 2–3.  
69. Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 742.  
70. Id. at 715. 
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opinions commanded a majority and that the Army Corps of Engineers 
and EPA were unable to promulgate regulations in response to SWANCC, 
which would have “merit[ed] deference under [the Court’s] generous 
standards . . . .”71  Justice Thomas joined Justice Scalia’s plurality, which 
concluded the CWA does not regulate non-surface waters that transfer 
pollution, or, as Justice Scalia put it, the “plain language of the [CWA] 
simply does not authorize . . . [a] ‘Land Is Waters’ approach to federal 
jurisdiction.”72  
Nonetheless, both Justices Ginsburg and Breyer joined in Justice 
Steven’s dissent asserting that the wetlands in question were 
interconnected with the filled-in channels, and therefore the CWA 
applied.73  With Justices Kagan, Sotomayor, Gorsuch, and Kavanaugh 
having joined the Court since it decided Rapanos, it is uncertain how those 
members Court will interpret the language of the CWA. However, both 
Justices Gorsuch and Kavanaugh clerked for Justice Kennedy in 1993.74 
Justice Kennedy’s concurring opinion in Rapanos came to the same 
conclusion as Justice Scalia’s plurality, but Justice Kennedy proposed that 
cases like Rapanos still need to analyze nonpoint sources like 
groundwater.75 Kennedy believed that if a “significant nexus” could be 
found between the groundwater—that conveyed the pollutants—and the 
polluted navigable waters then the point source of pollution should be 
regulated under the CWA.76 Justice Kennedy, through cases like SWANCC 
and Rapanos, has shown a pragmatic approach in interpreting the CWA77 
and his former clerks, Justices Gorsuch and Kavanaugh, may share that 
approach and find that the groundwater at issue has a “significant nexus” 
with the Pacific Ocean.78  
The Court will likely look at the definition of point source within 
the CWA and interpret the phrase, “from which pollutants are or may be 
discharged.”79 The Court will likely analyze whether “from” merely 
denotes a starting place for the pollution or the prior source of the pollution 
before it entered navigable waters.80  If the Court holds that “from” denotes 
 
71. Id. at 757–58 (Roberts, C.J., concurring). 
72. Id. at 734, 755. 
73. Id. at 787–88 (Stevens, J., with Souter, J., Breyer, J., Ginsburg, J., 
dissenting). 
74. Richard Wolf, Basketball, Popeyes, 2 Live Crew: The year Neil 
Gorsuch and Brett Kavanaugh clerked for Anthony Kennedy, USA TODAY (Aug. 30, 
2018), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2018/08/30/brett-kavanaugh-
neil-gorsuch-learned-supreme-court-ropes-together/1050836002/. 
75. Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 759 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
76. Id. (quoting SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 167).  
77. Norman A. Dupont, Justice Kennedy and Environmental Water 
Cases: A Pragmatic Approach To Water from a Western Perspective, AMERICAN 
BAR ASS’N (Sept. 10, 2018), 
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/environment_energy_resources/publications/tre
nds/2018-2019/september-october-2018/justice-kennedy-and-environmental/. 
78. Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 759 (quoting SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 167).  
79. 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14). 
80. See Pet’r’s Reply Br. at 12.; Br. for Resp’ts at 2–3. 
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the need for direct connection between the LWRF wells and the Pacific 
Ocean, then the analysis of the plain language will end. However, if the 
Court finds that “from” merely denotes a starting point for the pollution, 
it will most likely apply the “significant nexus” test.81  Because the 
undisputed facts show a traceable hydrologic connection between the 
LWRF wells, the groundwater, and the Pacific Ocean, the Court may hold 
that a significant nexus exists.82 If the Court chooses not to apply the 
“significant nexus” test, then it may find that the LWRF wells are not 
polluting directly into the Ocean but instead into a nonpoint source that 
could be regulated by the State of Hawaii.83   
Further, to address point source pollution transfer, the Court may 
examine Justice Scalia’s opinion in Rapanos.84  Justice Scalia chose not 
write “directly” into the language of point source transfer under the CWA, 
suggesting the Court may regard his comments as dicta.85 However, lower 
courts have interpreted his comments differently, so the Court may wish 
to set a standard with this case. In Kentucky, the Sixth Circuit held that 
groundwater was not discernible and could not be covered under the 
CWA.86  Meanwhile, the Fourth Circuit in Kinder held that “from . . . a 
point source” denoted a starting point, not the actual conveyance, of a 
pollutant and thus groundwater could be regulated under the CWA.87  
Considering this circuit split on groundwater and the CWA, the parties 
may push the Court to clarify—once and for all—whether the CWA covers 
pollution conveyances through entities like groundwater.  
Lastly, the EPA has sought an alternative solution to the issue and 
has stated that the Court should add a groundwater exception within the 
definition of “point source.”88  The Court may consider the EPA’s input 
on the issue because “[a]gencies delegated rulemaking authority under a 
statute such as the Clean Water Act are afforded generous leeway by the 
courts in interpreting the statute they are entrusted to administer.”89  
However, the EPA has not refined its position on the ambiguous nature of 
groundwater under the CWA, and has left [l]ower courts and regulated 
entities . . . to feel their way on a case-by-case basis” as they interpret the 
 
81. 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14); Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 715. 
82. Maui II, 886 F.3d at 743. 
83. See Pet’r’s Reply Br. at 21 (arguing that applying federal jurisdiction 
to nonpoint source regulation is an overstep that violates the CWA). 
84. Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 755. 
85. Id.  
86. Kentucky Waterways All., 905 F.3d at 933. 
87. Upstate Forever, 887 F.3d at 650 (quoting § 1362(12)(A)). 
88. Norman A. Dupont, County of Maui v. Hawai’i Wildlife Fund: A 
Preview of the Supreme Court’s Review of Clean Water Act Jurisdiction over 
Groundwater, AMERICAN BAR ASS’N (May 10, 2019), 
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/environment_energy_resources/publications/tre
nds/2018-2019/may-june-2019/county-of-maui/. 
89. Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 758 (Roberts, C.J., concurring) (citing Chevron 
U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–845 (1984)). 
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CWA and its inclusion of groundwater-connected pollution.90 Therefore, 
the Court will likely attempt to create a clear interpretation of the CWA— 
before it gives deference to the EPA— since the EPA has yet to clarify 
groundwater’s ambiguity under the CWA.91 Further, the EPA’s 
interpretation derives from Justice Scalia’s language in Rapanos, which is 
also responsible for the overly ambiguous treatment of the CWA. 
Therefore, the Court will likely seek to remedy the confusion around 
Rapanos rather than defer authority to the EPA.92   
 
B.   Congress’ Intent Behind the Clean Water Act 
 
In correcting the ambiguity of the CWA, the Court will likely look 
at Congress’ intent behind the “point source” definition and the CWA as 
a whole.93 First, Respondents assert that the CWA’s inclusion of wells as 
specific point sources must mean that the CWA was intended to regulate 
groundwater,94 whereas the County contends that the regulation of 
groundwater would be so excessive that if Congress had intended to 
regulate it, it would have explicitly said so in the CWA.95 If the Court finds 
that the CWA’s intent was to regulate the transfer of pollutants via 
groundwater, then the Court will likely expand upon the “significant 
nexus” test in order to create a more concise structure for determining 
groundwater regulation.96 However, if the Court does not accept that 
Congress intended to regulate pollutants conveyed through groundwater, 
then it will find for the County and settle the interpretation of point source 
pollution within the CWA.  
The Court may consider Respondents’ argument that the prior 
Refuse Act reflects congressional intent to regulate broadly using the 
CWA.97 The Refuse Act argument may slightly persuade the Court, but its 
interpretation did not present the same large-scale effect as the CWA.98 
Ultimately, the Court is more likely to look at similar water protection 
legislation and how that legislation treats groundwater. Respondents 
contend that the SDWA aims to “prevent underground injection from 
endangering drinking water sources”;99 therefore the Court may consider 
a pro-groundwater-regulation standpoint to create uniformity within the 
broad field of regulating water protection.100  
Lastly, the Court will look at Congress’ intent in executing the 
CWA. On its face, the CWA seeks to “restore and maintain the chemical, 
 
90. Id. 
91. Id.  
92. Id. at 755, 758. 
93. 33 U.S.C. 1362(14).  
94. Br. for Resp’ts at 13. 
95. Pet’r’s Reply Br. at 21. 
96. Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 715. 
97. Br. for Resp’ts at 25. 
98. Id.  
99. Id. at 49. 
100. See POM Wonderful LLC, 573 U.S. at 115. 
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physical, and biological integrity of the Nation’s waters.”101 The Court 
may choose to interpret CWA’s facial intent more broadly to meet the 
mission of the statute rather than to delineate the black-letter meaning of 
every phrase. However, if the Court continues to look at the mission of the 
CWA, it will find that states have an interest in regulating nonpoint source 
pollution, so the Court may give deference to states to regulate 




The Court has yet to directly address the CWA ambiguity left by 
the Rapanos decision and this case offers an excellent opportunity for the 
Court to set a standard for interpreting the CWA with respect to 
groundwater conveyance of pollutants into navigable waters. As 
hydrological sciences progress further—and the science community 
consistently identifies the intertwinement of groundwater and water 
pollution—the laws that govern its regulation are likely to become more 
complex and all encompassing. Ultimately, the Court has a great 
opportunity to recognize the connection between groundwaters and 















101. 33 U.S.C. 1362 § 1251(a). 
102. Id. § 1251(g); see Pet’r’s Reply Br. at 22. 
